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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
DESERET COMPANY, 
a Delaware corporation, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
v. 
JSJ CORPORATION, 
a Delaware corporation, 
Defendant-Respondent. 
* * * * * * * 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
BRIEF OF DEFENDANT-RESPONDENT 
Case No. 16992 
* * * * * * * 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
This case was originally brought by Appellant, Deseret 
Company, to recover money paid -and to obtain removal from 
Appellant's premises of an allegedly defective custom-made 
pharmaceuticals packaging machine, manufactured by Respondent 
for Appellant. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
Respondent was served with the Complaint in this case at 
its offices in Grand Haven, Michigan. Respondent thereupon 
moved to quash service of process and/or dismiss the Complaint. 
Hearing upon the motion was held on January 25, 1980 at which 
time Appellant was allowed an opportunity to produce an 
additional counter-affidavit relating to the jurisdictional 
issues. Thereafter, Appellant supplied the court with the 
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requested affidavit and on February 19, 1980 the court granted 
Respondent's motion to quash service of process and dismiss the 
Complaint for lack of jurisdiction over the Respondent based on 
the Court's finding that: 
[T]his was a single isolated transaction, 
initiated originally by plaintiff's 
[Appellant's] telephone call based upon 
the single ad in a trade journal. In my 
opinion these facts do not warrant a finding 
that the "minimal contacts" requirements of 
due process have been met. (Record on 
Appeal at 63) 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Defendant-Respondent JSJ Corporation seeks to have the 
Order dismissing the Complaint and quashing service of process 
for lack of jurisdiction of the lower court affirmed. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Respondent does not believe that all of the material facts 
pertinent to this particular matter have been set forth in the 
Statement of Facts in Appellant's Brief. Rather than attempt to 
just set forth omitted facts which Respondent believes are 
material the following Statement of Facts is provided by the 
Respondent. 
Appellant, Deseret Company (plaintiff below), is a Delaware 
Corporation authorized to do business and doing business in Utah 
including at a facility in Sandy, Utah. Respondent, JSJ Corpora-
tion (defendant below), is a Delaware corporation with its 
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principal place of business in Grand Haven, Michigan. It is not 
qualified or authorized to do business in Utah, and has no 
offices, factories, warehouses or other places of business in 
Utah. Respondent has no telephone listing, bank account, 
inventory, files, books of account, facilities, investments or 
other real or personal property in the State of Utah. It has no 
employees or salesmen working in the State of Utah on a regular 
basis. (Affidavit of Paul A. Johnson, Record on Appeal 
at 14-15). 
In late 1974 or early 1975, Respondent advertised in 
certain trade journals, none of which were directed specifically 
to the State of Utah. {Affidavit of Lee S. Kihnke, Record on 
Appeal at 50). Mr. George Ford was a former employee of 
Appellant and was charged with the responsibility of acquiring a 
packaging machine for the processing of some of Appellant's 
products. In seeking a manufacturer for such a machine he 
reviewed trade journals and noted an advertisement by Respondent 
as a manufacturer of packaging machines. Ford thereupon con-
tacted Respondent's Michigan office stating that Appellant may 
be interested in ordering and developing a custom-made pharma-
ceuticals packaging machine. (Affidavit of George Ford, Record 
on Appeal at 59-60) . Respondent had not manufactured such a 
machine before. Consequently, Mr. Kihnke, general manager of 
Dake Corporation, Packaging and Machinery Division of JSJ 
Corporation, traveled to Utah to discuss Appellant's needs and 
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the development and production of such a machine. Nothing came 
of these contacts, as Appellant acquired a machine from another 
source. Thereafter, Mr. George Ford left the employ of the 
Appellant. (Affidavit of George Ford, Record on Appeal at 60; 
Affidavit of Lee S. Kihnke, Record on Appeal at 53,54). Nearly 
two years later, on March 29, 1977, Appellant mailed to Respondent 
at Grand Haven, Michigan, samples of the packaging materials and 
specifications for a new machine. Respondent replied with a 
proposal, contained in a letter dated April 6, 1977. On August 
10, 1977, a second letter was sent by Respondent JSJ requoting 
its bid for the machinery. On November 8, 1977, Appellant sent 
adqitional packaging samples and specifications and requested a 
bid on a machine as soon as possible. Respondent replied with a 
second revised proposal based on the new samples and specif ica-
tions, on November 29, 1977, which included, inter alia, the 
following conditions of sale: 
3. Acceptance. No order, sale, agreement 
for sale, accepted proposal, offer to sell 
and/or contract of sale shall be binding upon 
Dake unless accepted by an officer of Dake 
at its office in the City of Grand Haven, 
Ottawa County, Michigan on an order acknow-
ledgement letter. 
6. Shipment: Shipments are made F.O.B. 
Dake's plant of manufacture. 
* * * 
18. Law: The rights and duties of all 
persons and the construction and effect of 
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all provisions hereof shall be governed by 
and construed according to the laws of 
Michigan. (Emphasis added) (Affidavit of 
Lee S. Kihnke, Record on Appeal at 54-55). 
On February 17, 1978, Appellant mailed to Respondent in 
Grand Haven Michigan, a Purchase Order agreeing to the terms of 
Respondent's order proposal of November 29, 1977, with certain 
stated exceptions, which order was accepted by Respondent in 
Michigan. The acceptance was confirmed by letter of February 17, 
1978. Appellant sent a truck to pick up the completed machinery 
at Respondent's plant in Grand Haven, Michigan on August 16, 
1978. (Affidavit of Lee s. Kihnke, Record on Appeal at 54-55). 
Installation was supervised by one of Respondent's 
employees who came to Utah for that purpose. The machine 
allegedly did not function properly and in November 1978 two of 
Respondent's employees came to Utah and spent four days working 
on the machine. (Affidavit of James c. Loveless, Record on 
Appeal at 39-40). 
Respondent's negotiations with Deseret and production of 
the pharmaceuticals packaging machine were the direct result of 
Appellant's inquiry and requests for bids. (Affidavit of 
Lee S. Kihnke, Record on Appeal at 55). 
Appellant filed this action in Utah alleging, inter alia, 
that the machine is "defective and inoperative", that it has not 
and will not "operate according to the specifications in the 
sale documents" and that defendant has "breached the agreement 
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of sale by supplying a packaging machine which will not perform 
the functions for which it was designed and sold to plaintiff in 
violation of express and implied warranties of salen. As to 
jurisdictional facts Appellant's Complaint merely states the 
conclusion that: 
Defendant has transacted business and is 
doing business in the State of Utah pursuant 
to the applicable provisions of the Utah 
"long arm" statute, and is subject to the 
jurisdiction of the above-entitled court. 
(See Complaint, Record on Appeal at 2-3). 
Respondent, by special appearance, demonstrated through 
affidavit, memoranda and oral argument, to the satisfaction of 
the lower court that it in fact was not doing business or 
transacting business within the State and was not otherwise 
amenable to long-arm jurisdiction inasmuch as it did not have 
"minimum contacts" with Utah sufficient to satisfy due process. 
From the ruling of the trial court to that effect, Appellant 
prosecutes this appeal. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE ACTIVITIES OF THE RESPONDENT DO NOT 
CONSTITUTE "DOING BUSINESS" IN THE 
STATE OF UTAH AND ARE NOT SUFFICIENT 
FOR IN PERSONAM JURISDICTION ON THAT BASIS 
While Appellant in its Complaint suggests that Respondent 
is subject to the jurisdiction of the Court in Utah because it 
is doing business in the State, it does not pursue this basis 
of jurisdiction on appeal. Respondent agrees that under the 
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"solicitation plus" test which this Court has developed and the 
extensive contacts with the forum that are necessary to consti-
tute "doing business" in Utah, the facts of this case clearly 
demonstrate that Respondent is not doing business in Utah and is 
not subject to jurisdiction on that basis. See, Burt Drilling, 
Inc. v. Pacific Hydro Corp., 608 P.2d 294 (Utah 1980). 
POINT II 
THE ACTIVITIES OF THE RESPONDENT 
DO NOT SATISFY THE GROUNDS 
DELINEATED IN THE UTAH LONG-ARM 
STATUTE WHICH ARE ALLEGED AND/OR 
RELIED UPON BY APPELLANT 
Assertion of jurisdiction under the Utah Long-Arm Statute, 
Utah Code Ann., §§78-27-22 to -28 (1953), involves two elements. 
First, the non-resident's activities within the State must 
satisfy one of the ~rounds delineated in the statute for 
assertion of jurisdiction and the cause of action must arise out 
of such contacts. Secondly, the exercise of jurisdiction must 
meet due process, minimum contacts requirements. 
In Abbott G.M. Diesel, Inc. v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 578 
P.2d 850 (Utah 1978) this Court, in a unanimous opinion, stated: 
[T]he long-arm statute can be invoked only 
if there are allegations that one or more 
of the enumerated acts therein obtain. 
(Emphasis added) . 
The plaintiff in that case alleged that its claims arose from 
the transaction of business, contracting to supply services or 
goods and breach of warranty. In its Complaint, the Appellant 
-7-
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in this case asserts Respondent is subject to jurisdiction 
because it was involved in the "transaction of business" and 
was "doing business" in the State. On appeal, Appellant has 
gone beyond the scope of its pleadings and suggests that juris-
diction may also be based on the long-arm grounds of contracting 
to supply services or goods in Utah or causing injury within 
Utah by breach of warranty. 
Respondent submits that it is not transacting business 
within the State, as more fully discussed below, and that the 
other bases for assertion of long-arm jurisdiction are not 
appropriately before the Court for consideration. However, 
assuming, arguendo, that these other grounds raised by Appellant's 
brief are appropriate for consideration, Respondent submits that 
the facts of this case do not justify their application. 
A. Respondent Did Not Transact 
Business Within the State of Utah 
Utah Code Ann., §78-27-23, (1953), defines "transaction of 
business within this State" as follows: 
Activities of a nonresident person, his agents 
or representatives in this state which affect 
persons or businesses within the State of Utah. 
(Emphasis added) . 
Appellant claims that this standard is met by Respondent by 
corning here to solicit Appellant's business, by communicating 
with Appellant by telephone and through the mails, by selling 
-8-
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Appellant a machine worth approximately $90,000.00, knowing that 
it would be used in Utah, and by sending its employees and repre-
sentatives here to install, service and attempt to repair the 
machine. 
As set forth in the statement of facts, Respondent traveled 
to Utah in response to Appellant's solicitation. Moreover, no 
contract was entered into as a result of that visit. The communi-
cations and telephone conversations, and the consummating of the 
contract in Michigan obviously do not involve activities or 
presence of Respondent, its agents or representatives in Utah. 
Finally, even if the installation and subsequent service work by 
Respondent in Utah were sufficient to constitute the transaction 
of business in the State, they are not the activities which give 
rise and/or result in Appellant's claim. Appellant has not 
alleged any breach of the installation contract. Rather, the 
claim goes to the design and manufacture of the machinery which 
occurred in Michigan. Clearly under the statutory standard, 
Respondent did not transact business in the State of Utah. 
The concurring opinion of Justice Stewart in Burt Drilling, 
Inc., supra, sustained the decision that Pacific Hydro was 
amenable to jurisdiction only on the long-arm basis of "causing 
any injury within this State whether tortious or by breach of 
warranty". This he did because in precedential long-arm juris-
diction cases involving causes of action based on the transaction 
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of business within the State, the Supreme Court had "found the 
necessary significant minimal contacts on the basis of more than 
a single act performed within the State". In the instant case, 
Respondent submits that it has not transacted any business in 
this State giving rise to this cause of action, much less does it 
have a multiplicity of acts within this State as required by Utah 
decisional law. 
B. Appellant's Cause of Action Does Not Arise 
Out of Respondent's Contracting to 
Supply Services in the State 
Appellant did not plead Respondent's contracting to supply 
services in the State as a basis for jurisdiction and therefore 
this basis of long-arm jurisdiction should not be relied upon 
on appeal. But even assuming, arguendo, that the Court may 
consider this ground of jurisdiction, it is not appropriate 
under the facts of this case. 
In its brief, Appellant asserts that: 
[Respondent's] actions fall within this pro-
vision of the Long-Arm Statute, [contracting to 
supply services or goods in this State] . . . 
because it contracted to provide a factory 
trained service technician to supervise the 
installation of the machine in Utah which 
plaintiff purchased from defendant. The 
installation was plainly a service and the 
contract to provide such a service in Utah 
places defendant squarely within the ambit of 
the Long-Arm Statute. 
(Brief of Appellant at 3-4). As noted in Appellant's Statement 
of Facts, the "Dake Installation Policy" was a separate document, 
independent of the contract proposal to sell and manufacture 
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the machinery which is in issue herein. Even if the installa-
tion policy is considered a contract for services in the State, 
Appellant's Complaint does not allege any breach of the 
installation contract, or warranties related thereto, or any 
defective or negligent installation. Rather, Appellant seeks to 
rescind the contract for sale and manufacture of the machinery 
and recover its money paid thereon based on Respondent's alleged 
breach of the contract by providing defective machinery or by 
breaching implied warranties of sale and manufacture. 
In the recent case of Roskelley & Co. v. Lerco, Inc., 
No. 15987 (Utah, April 11, 1980) this Court reaffirmed its 
position that in actions brought pursuant to the long-arm Statute 
the "plaintiff must show that his claim arises out of some contact 
defendant has with the forum State." The Court declined the 
invitation to extend this requirement to embrace claims sued on 
which have a "nexus" with, but do not arise out of a defendant's 
activities within the forum or claims which have a "close rela-
tionship" with the non-resident defendant's jurisdictional 
activities. (Slip Opinion at 13-14). 
Respondent submits that in the instant case just as in 
Roskelly, supra, ''it does not here assist the plaintiff to show 
the contacts the defendant has with the forum if the specific 
litigation at bar does not arise out of any of those contacts". 
(Slip. Opinion at 5). 
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In Roskelly, supra, the cause of action was based on an 
alleged contract for commissions on the sale of certain equip-
ment ultimately to a Utah corporation. The Court found that 
though the defendant's contacts with the State in being present 
to oversee the installation of the equipment may be sufficient 
for jurisdiction if the litigation involved an action for breach 
of warranty or negligence in installing the equipment, the 
plaintiff could not avail himself of such contacts for the 
purpose of his claim on an entirely different contract. Likewise, 
in the case at bar, Appellant's claim is based on an entirely 
different contract (manufacture and sale) than the one which 
resulted in Respondent's contact with the forum (installation), 
or at best a completely separate phase and aspect of the same 
contract, and such contact is thus not available to Appellant to 
support a claim of jurisdiction in this action. 
c. Respondent Did Not Contract 
To Provide Goods in Utah 
This basis of long-arm jurisdiction also was not alleged 
in Appellant's Complaint and is not properly before the Court. 
But even assuming, arguendo, that consideration is appropriate 
Appellant has not specifically relied on this basis of juris-
diction and the facts do not warrant its application. 
As is discussed in the Statement of Facts, Appellant and 
Respondent entered a contract negotiated by mail and telephone 
which contract was accepted by Respondent and therefore 
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consummated at Respondent's place of business in Michtgan, as 
per the contract provisions. Thus, the contracting to supply 
goods did not occur in Utah. Moreover, the contract did not 
call for the supplying of goods in Utah. Rather, Respondent was 
to manufacture the machinery in Michigan and hold the machinery 
there for pickup by Appellant. Thus, the goods were supplied to 
the Appellant in Michigan. Moreover, Appellant does not appear 
to claim jurisdiction based on contracting to supply goods in 
the State. Rather, Appellant bases its claim for jurisdiction 
on Respondent's contracting to provide services in the State of 
Utah, apparently acknowledging that there must be some activity 
within the State for long-arm jurisdiction to obtain. 
Just as in the case of long-arm jurisdiction based on the 
transaction of business in the State, Justice Stewart in Burt 
Drilling Corp., supra, summarized Utah precedent as requiring 
more than a single act performed in the State in order to 
satisfy the necessary significant minimal contacts necessary 
to invoke jurisdiction in causes of action arising out of 
the contracting to supply services or goods in the State. 
In the instant case Respondent submits that it has not 
contracted to supply goods in Utah nor done any act, much less 
several acts in contracting to supply goods, in the State as 
required by Utah decisional law. 
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D. Respondent Did Not Cause Injury 
Within this State Whether Tortious 
Or by Breach of Warranty 
Again, this provision of the long-arm statute is not 
invoked by Appellant's Complaint and cannot be relied on by 
Apellant here. In any event, this basis of jurisdiction is 
not supported by the facts. 
Appellant's Complaint alleges, inter alia, that Respondent 
"breached the Agreement of Sale by supplying a packaging machine 
which will not perform the functions for which it was designed 
and sold to plaintiff in violation of express and implied 
warranties of sale'', and that the machine is "totally defective 
and inoperative". 
Appellant does not recite these charges in support of a 
product's liability claim, or a claim for damages for breach of 
warranty. Rather, Appellant makes these allegations to support 
its theory of breach of contract and its prayer for recission 
and restitution. 
Respondent submits that this cause of action for recission 
and restitution is not a claim for "injury" caused by breach of 
warranty. Moreover, this Court has recognized that "financial 
injury" which occurs in Utah to a Utah plaintiff as the result 
of alleged wrongdoing outside of the State is not a sufficient 
basis for jurisdiction. See, Hydroswift Corp. v. Louie's Boats 
and Motors, Inc., 27 Utah 2d 233, 494 P.2d 532 (1972); Burt 
Drilling Corp., (Stewart J. concurring), supra, at 9. A 
contrary result would allow assertion of jurisdiction over a 
-14-
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non-resident in any forum in which a plaintiff may locate. Such 
would clearly be an abuse of long-arm jurisdiction. 
Respondent submits that scrutiny of Appellant's Complaint 
demonstrates that it is not based on "injury within the state by 
breach of warranty" as that phrase has been construed by Utah 
Courts. Plaintiff is suing for rescission not for damages. Even 
assuming plaintiffs' claim could be construed to allege injury, 
it is clear that such injury would only be financial in nature. 
POINT III 
ASSERTION OF JURISDICTION 
OVER RESPONDENT IN THIS CASE 
WOULD VIOLATE DUE PROCESS 
The landmark case of International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 
326 U.S. 310, 90 L. Ed. 95, 66 s. Ct. 154 (1945) laid down a new 
test regarding a State's jurisdiction of nonresidents. That test 
provided that to obtain in personam jurisdiction of a defendant, 
the due process clause requires "certain minimum contacts" within 
the forum and that the maintenance of the suit does not "offend 
traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice". The 
Court added that these demands of due proces·s "may be met by such 
contacts of the corporation with the state of the forum as make 
it reasonable in the context of our federal system of government 
to require the corporation to defend the particular suit which is 
brought there." 
The Supreme Court in Hanson v. Denkla, 357 U.S. 235, 
2 L. Ed. 2d 1283, 78 S. Ct. 1228 (1958) warned that it is a 
mistake to assume that International Shoe and its progeny 
"herald the eventual demise of all restrictions on the personal 
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jurisdiction of state courts". The Court also stated that the 
application of the "minimum contacts" rule will vary with the 
quality and nature of the defendant's activity, but that it is 
essential in each case "that there be some act by which the 
defendant purposefully avails itself of the privilege of con-
ducting activities within the forum state, thus, invoking the 
benefits and protections of its laws.n (Emphasis added). 
There are numerous cases from other jurisdictions which 
have held that activities parallel to those in the instant case 
were insufficient to meet the due process limitations 
ennunciated by the United States Supreme Court. In Saletko 
v. Willys Motors, Inc., 36 Ill. App. 2d 7, 183 N.E.2d 569 (1962), 
the plaintiff sued for breach of a foreign corporation's con-
tractual promise to sell and deliver certain auto parts. The 
Court held that the defendant was not subject to jurisdiction as 
it never was physically present in Illinois (the forum) and the 
parts were delivered outside of Illinois to a trucking company 
(agent of the purchaser) for shipment to the purchaser. Like-
wise, in Morgan v. Heckle, 171 F. Supp. 482 (D.Ill. 1959), a 
non-resident seller's motion to quash was granted where the only 
contacts the seller had with Illinois were that the plaintiff's 
telephone order was made from Illinois, the goods were shipped 
c.o.d. to Illinois, and payment was made from Illinois and 
received in Tennessee. The defendant was never physically 
present in Illinois and had no agent there. 
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Due process was held to prohibit assertion of jurisdiction 
in Chassis-Trak, Inc. v. Federated Purchaser, Inc., 179 F. Supp. 
780 (D.N.J. 1960). The case involved a single business trans-
action in which all pertinent negotiations, including the 
purchase order were by mail and telephone. 
The Court granted the defendant's motion to dismiss for 
lack of jurisdiction in Old Westbury Golf & Country Club, Inc. 
v. Mitchell, 44 Misc. 2d 68 7, 254 N.Y.S.2d 679, aff'd, 219 
N.E.2d 868 (1961), where the contract was executed in Ohio and 
the defendant did nothing in New York (the forum) as regards the 
plaintiff's cause of action, except deliver the materials 
involved. In addition, a single conversation had taken place in 
New York more than a month before the Ohio contract was 
executed. 
In Erlanger Mills, Inc. v. Cohoes Fibre Mills, Inc., 239 
F.2d 502 (4th Cir. 1956), the plaintiff placed an order with the 
defendant, a non-resident manufacturer, which order was accepted 
at defendant's plant in New York. The goods were sold f .o.b. 
the seller's plant in New York. After receipt of the shipment, 
plaintiff complained that the goods were defective. There were 
several communications between the parties. The defendant's 
manager went to the forum to discuss the complaint. The court 
rejected the argument that a single interstate shipment and the 
presence of the defendant in the state to discuss the claim 
constituted minimum contacts. 
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The defendant in AMCO Transworld, Inc. v. M/V Bambi, 257 
F. Supp. 215 (D.Tex. 1966), a French corporation, accepted 
purchase orders in France, mailed notice of acceptance to the 
plaintiff, shipped the goods to Texas, and received payment by 
issuing drafts drawn on a Texas bank. The defendant's 
commercial director had made two trips to Texas prior to the 
execution of this contract and solicited business there without 
achieving the consummation of the contracts within the state. 
The Court held that these activities did not satisfy the minimum 
contacts test. 
In the present case, Appellant saw an advertisement of the 
Respondent's. That advertisement was not specifically directed 
to Appellant or Utah, but rather appeared in a trade journal. 
The specific relationship between the parties was initiated by 
Appellant when its employee contacted Respondent by telephone. 
In response to Appellant's inquiry, Respondent's employee came 
to Utah. No contract was consummated in Utah and nothing came 
of this visit. Appellant purchased the machine it was then 
seeking from another companyo Clearly, plaintiff's subsequent 
purchase of a different machine and its resulting alleged cause 
of action did not arise from the Respondent's trip to the forum. 
The contract which is the basis of this lawsuit was with-
out doubt initiated by Appellant when it sent samples and specifi-
cations to Respondent and requested a bid. At this time 
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it is interesting to note that Appellant's employee who had 
originally seen Respondent's advertisement and who suggested that 
Respondent manufacture the first machine, had left the company. 
Conununications by telephone and mail resulted in the consummation 
of the contract finally in Michigan. Respondent performed the 
contract at issue in this case in Michigan, inasmuch as the 
machinery was manufactured there and was sold and turned over to 
Appellant there. Appellants then had a truck take the machinery 
to Utah. Respondent's installation of the machinery in Utah, as 
discussed above, does not involve a contact with Utah pertinent 
to this litigation. Respondent's other trips to Utah in response 
to Appellant's claim that the machinery was defective, to make 
adjustments and hopefully resolve or settle the matter, are not 
available to Appellant to show contacts with the State as 
Appellant's cause of action does not arise out of such contacts. 
A contrary result, allowing contacts which occur after the alleged 
cause of action has arisen, made in an effort to work the situation 
out, to be used by Appellant to support its claim of jurisdiction 
is clearly not contemplated by the long-arm statute. 
Appellant's claim arises out of the isolated sale and manu-
facture of machinery which was ultimately located in Utah. The 
record clearly indicates that Respondent was not qualified to do 
business in Utah, does not maintain offices, factories, ware-
houses or other places of business in Utah, has no telephone 
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listing, bank accounts, inventory, books of account, facilities 
or other files, real or personal property in the state. 
Appellant suggests that recent decisions announced by this 
Court require the exercise of jurisdiction of the Respondent in 
this case. Respondent submits that these cases are distinguishable 
from the instant case and that the principles ennunciated therein 
demonstrate that a finding of jurisdiction in this case would 
violate due process. 
Burt Drilling, Inc., supra, differs from the present case in 
that the record there clearly indicated that the defendant was a 
nationwide, multistate business and consequently should reasonably 
expect to be required to defend suits in foreign forums. Appellant 
cannot rely on this argument in the instant case as there is 
nothing in the record that treats this beyond the fact of some 
trade journal advertising in late 1974 or early 1975. Moreover, 
in Burt Drilling, Inc., supra, the Court made reference to the 
fact that the defendant had a security interest in the machinery 
located in Utah, thereby invoking the protection of Utah law. 
Consequently, the Court felt it would be fair to require the 
defendant to be subject to jurisdiction in Utah. There is no 
evidence in this case that Respondent had such a security interest. 
Finally, the plurality holding in Burt Drilling, Inc., supra; was 
that the defendant was subject to jurisdiction on the basis of 
causing injury in the State. The injury in that case consisted 
of the fact that the equipment failed to operate properly causing 
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plaintiff to lose drilling contracts, and resulting in loss of 
some of the machinery parts which fell into a well casing and 
could not be removed. Justice Stewart characterized the injury 
as tortious injury in the State and distinguished it from the 
financial injury in the State alleged in Hydro-Swift Corp. v. 
Louie's Boats & Motors, Inc., and which allegedly exists in the 
present case, which was held to be insufficient contact with the 
State to satisfy due process. 
In Roskelly & Co., supra, this Court ordered the lower court 
to dismiss the plaintiff's complaint for lack of jurisdiction. 
In reaching this decision the Court noted as relevant the fact 
that the specific contacts between the parties were initiated by 
the plaintiff's telephone call from Utah to the defendant, just 
as they were in the instant case. The record apparently does not 
demonstrate how plaintiff came to· be acquainted with defendant --
whether by advertisement, prior business dealings, or otherwise. 
The Court focused on the direct contact between the parties 
initiated by plaintiff's telephone call. Also of significance to 
the Court was the fact that the defendant entered Utah only for 
the purpose of supervising the installation of the equipment it 
had sold. The Court held that this contact would be significant 
if suit were brought based on negligence or breach of warranty in 
installing the equipment, but that it had no relevance in a suit 
on an entirely different contract. The same situation obtains in 
the instant case. Finally, the Court also noted with interest 
that the defendant in that case, like the Respondent in this 
case, was not qualified to do business in Utah. 
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In Ted R. Brown and Associates v. Carnes Corp., No. 15978 
(Utah April 24, 1980) jurisdiction of a foreign corporation was 
determined to be appropriate. The foreign corporation in that 
case, however, had local sales representatives who were under 
contract in the State of Utah, and had a substantial volume of 
business in the State. Through these agents the corporation 
received orders for sales of its goods and supplied those goods 
in the State seeking the benefits of the Utah market. In the 
particular transaction in issue in that case representatives of 
the foreign corporation came to Utah and combined their efforts 
with the local sales representative to sell their product, make 
adaptations thereof to satisfy the purchaser's needs and to 
install it. Plaintiff, a sales representative, sued for its 
conunission due from this sale. 
In the instant case, Respondent does not have the sub-
stantial activities in the forum that Carnes Corporation had. It 
has no local sales representatives. It did not negotiate or 
consununate the contract in issue here in Utah. There is no 
evidence in the record that it had the volume of business within 
Utah that Carnes Corporation enjoyed. 
In Mallory Engineering, Inc. v. Brown, Nos. 15530 and 
15544. (Utah, Mar. 6, 1980) defendant not only contracted to 
sell goods to a Utah buyer but contracted to deliver the goods 
in Utah, unlike Respondent here who supplied the machinery to the 
Appellant in Michigan. This was considered to be a purposeful 
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contact with the State whereby the defendant availed himself of 
the privilege of conducting activities within the State. 
In its brief Appellant notes that the Mallory decision 
requires a balancing of the interest and inconveniences of the 
parties as part of the due process inquiry. However, contrary to 
Appellant's suggestion, in the due process balancing of incon-
veniences, risk of default by the defendant is not the only 
consideration in the equation. Another factor is whether the 
defendant is a multistate or local manufacturer or business. 
Except for the fact of Respondent's advertising in general trade 
journals in 1974 and 1975, plaintiff has not established in the 
record before the Court the interstate sweep of Respondent's 
business. The instant transaction was consummated 
and performed all at Respondent's place of business in Michigan. 
The Mallory Court did note, however, that even the operation of 
interstate business alone cannot justify personal jurisdiction 
over a non-resident defendant. Finally, while the machine is 
located in Utah and inspection thereof may have some value, 
Appellant's action is based on the machine's failure to perform 
according to contract specifications and warranties. The 
machine was developed and custom made in Michigan. All of the 
witnesses with knowledge of the manufacture are located in 
Michigan. 
While utah may have an interest in providing a forum to its 
residents to seek redress against non-residents, due process 
cannot be violated in so doing. 
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CONCLUSION 
Respondent is not doing business in Utah. Hence it may be 
subject to jurisdiction in the State only if it has activities 
within the state that satisfy the long-arm statute, the cause of 
action specifically arises out of those specific activities, and 
exercise of jurisdiction would not offend due process. Respondent 
submits that it did not transact business in the State, contract 
to provide goods in the State or cause injury in the State as 
those terms are given content by Utah cases, and that Respondent's 
activities in the forum, if any, did not give rise to the 
present cause of action. 
Assertion of jurisdiction in this case would offend due 
process requirements as recognized in cases from other juris-
dictions. Moreover, recent Utah cases which have upheld the 
application of long-arm jurisdiction are distinguishable from 
the present case, and the principles recently ennunciated by 
this Court demonstrate that a finding of jurisdiction in this 
case would violate due process. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this~~~ ) .' 
GIFFotID ~· PRICE~-
1980. 
LISA M.'PEARSON 
GREENE, CALLISTER & NEBEKER 
Attorney for Defendant-Respondent 
Suite 800 - Kennecott Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84133 
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